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グリーンと快楽主義の倫理学
https://ous.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/318
https://ous.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/318bf0baade-254e-464b-8d55-8c9d98334557
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
KJ00000062870.pdf (1.6 MB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文(ELS) / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||||||
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| 公開日 | 1965-09-30 | |||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||
| タイトル | グリーンと快楽主義の倫理学 | |||||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||
| タイトル | T.H. Green and the Ethics of Hedonism | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||||
| タイトル | グリーン ト カイラク シュギ ノ リンリガク | |||||||||||
| 言語 | ja-Kana | |||||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||||
| 言語 | jpn | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||||||
| ページ属性 | ||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | P(論文) | |||||||||||
| 著者名 |
行安, 茂
× 行安, 茂
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| 著者所属(日) | ||||||||||||
| ja | ||||||||||||
| 岡山理科大学 | ||||||||||||
| 抄録(英) | ||||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||||
| 内容記述 | Green and Sidgwick are great philosophers in England in the nineteenth century. The former belongs to the school of idealism. The latter is an Utilitarian based on intuitionism. They considered the central problems of ethics. Green criticized Sidgwick's Hedonism. According to Sidgwick, pleasure is identified with Ultimate Good. The greatest possible sum or pleasure is the supreme end of action. But Green affirmed that pleasant feelings are not quantities that can be added. For each is over before the other begins. Green says that the greatest possible sum of pleasure is an end which for ever receds. This is called the consciousness of the transiency of pleasure. On the other hand, Sidgwick criticized the conception of self in Green. According to Green, self is a self that abides and contemplates itself as abiding. This self must be satisfied in any way. Green's self-satisfaction is the satisfaction of abiding self. But Sidgwick criticized this point. According to Sidgwick, eternal self-satisfaction does not seem to be derived from Green's self. Green's principle in knowledge is a self-distinguishing consciousness. Sidgwick says that the consciousness distinguishes human spirit from divine spirit. Thus, human spirit cannot be identified with divine spirit. On what ground does Green assert eternal self-satisfaction? This is the question of Sidgwick. Green criticized Sidgwick's Ultimate Good. According to Sidgwick, Ultimate Good is Universal Pleasure. This pleasure is to be seeked as desirable. In Sidgwick the desirable is another person's pleasure. Green asserts that the desirableness of a pleasure must be the pleasure of some one else than the person desiring the enjoyment of the pleasure. Green says that a man cannot seek his own pleasure as desirable. It is from Sidgwick's reason that he is subject to these criticisms. According to Green's view, reason seeks Ultimate Good as a state of its own being. Reason is the source of the idea of a perfect self-consious life for every one. Green is concerned with a constant and fixed self. Sidgwick's ethical principles are rational self-love and benevolence. Green asks 'How are the two reconciled?' In Sidgwick they seem to be unreconciled. Judging from these considerations, we know that Green is interested in the unitv of self. | |||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||||
| 雑誌書誌ID | ||||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AN00033233 | |||||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
ja : 岡山理科大学紀要 en : Bulletine of Okayama University of Science 巻 1, p. 107-122, 発行日 1965-09-30 |
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