

# T. H. Green And J. Dewey\*

Shigeru YUKIYASU

Received September 30, 1973

Green died 26th, March, 1882, but he exercised considerable influences not only in England, but also in the United States of America. It is said that his influences ended in 1910. Since G. E. Moore's article on "The Refutation of Idealism" appeared in 1903, English Idealism has been open to criticism. And it has been substituted by the new Realism. Thus, Green's influences have disappeared from the beginning of this century. It was true that there was a philosopher of Idealism, J. H. Muirhead (1855—1940), who said "I think I am the last of the idealist old gang" (In Memoriam, Philosophy, Vol., XV., 1940). But many philosophers tended to be interested in the new Realism, which was originated by Moore and Russell. This Philosophy played a part in destroying English Idealism, and therefore arose against it rather than for the development of it. On the other hand, Dewey's instrumentalism seems to be the philosophy which was influenced by Green's idealism. Though Dewey developed his philosophy upon a basis different from Green's, he seems to be sympathetic with the latter. The following two articles may be useful in considering this problem. The First of these is one on "An Idealistic Source of Instrumentalism" by S. P. Lamprecht, in *Mind*, 33, 1924. He, who was a Professor of University of Illinois, pointed out the influences of Green upon Dewey. The second is one on "Instrumentalism and Idealism" by F. C. Schiller, in *Mind*, 34, 1925. He said in this paper that the influences of Kant, Hegel, Lotze, and Bradley upon Dewey were doubtful, but recognized that 'that of Green is surely significant' (*Mind*, 34, 1925, P. 76). Are there any connections between Green and Dewey? J. S. Mackenzie pointed out the following difference between Pragmatism and the new Realism.: "Pragmatism says—to put it broadly—that our world is what we arbitrarily make it for ourselves. It is a variant on the *homo mensura* of Protagoras, a new form of scepticism, differing from the old through its being based on a recognition of the volitional character of the human consciousness, rather than on a recognition of its sensational character. The new Realism, on the other hand, maintains that our world is simply made for us and presented for us—that it is not a construction, but a datum". (*Mind*, 15, 1906, P. 310). According to Pragmatism, the world can be seen as a "what we arbitrarily make it for ourselves", and it is not a "datum", but a "construction". This view is directly opposite to the new Realism, and at the same time it is very similar to Green's, which is based on the constructive operation of reason both in knowledge and morals. Green's self-realization seems to be a theory for 'what we arbitrarily make it for ourselves'. Of course, there is a difference between Pragmatism and Green's idealism, but there is also a common point between them. Lamprecht's attempt to discover the source of the instrumentalism of Dewey in the idealism of Green may be worth while

---

\* A lecture delivered at the Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University, 23 April, 1973

paying attention to.

Now there are probably several methods of dealing with the relationship of Green to Dewey. There is a way to do so under the aspect of the developmental process of Dewey's thought. Or we can compare their philosophies, and point out the difference and similarity between them. Or we can also consider how Dewey was influenced by Green in the formative period of the former's thought. I will compare Green with Dewey by confining myself to the latter's early articles about the former. One of these is an article on "Green's theory of the Moral Motive", in the *Philosophical Review*, I, 1892, and the other is one on "Self Realization as the Moral Ideal", in the *Philosophical Review*, II, 1893. Further. I will compare these with "Reconstruction in Philosophy", not to see how the thought of Dewey has come to grow up, but to know Dewey's clear views about Instrumentalism. Thus, I will make clear the points implied in Green's self-realization, but at the same time I will point out what Dewey's interests are.

## I

What is defective in the philosophy of idealism? We hear that idealists are too strongly interested in an ideal to see actual conditions. We also hear that their ways of thinking are too abstract to adapt themselves to specific situations. What is the case with Green? Says Dewey: "Surely, if Green is correct, he has revealed the illusion which has kept men striving for something which they cannot get, and, the illusion detected, men will give up the strife which leads only to dissatisfaction" (*The Philosophical Review*, I, 1892, P. 601). Why was Green's ideal regarded as an "illusion"? One of the reasons is that he defined good as the satisfaction of desire. A complete satisfaction may be found in an ideal, but man cannot attain this end in this world. He can only try to realize the satisfaction. This can be the motive of moral action in Green, but Dewey said, "men will give up the strife which leads only to dissatisfaction," Therefore, it cannot be the motive. Green might have thought that man could satisfy himself with the endeavour of realising such an ideal satisfaction. Secondly, Green's ideal is separated from the actual, and it is only an "illusion". Therefore, it cannot move us to action in specific situations. Dewey shows that Green's ideal is only an abstract one, and it is short of its concreteness. Dewey considered how the ideal was able to operate on the actual. "Instead of being a tool which can be brought into fruitful relations to special circumstances so as to help determine what should be done, it remains the bare thought of an ideal of perfection, having nothing in common with the special set of conditions or with the special desire of the moment" (*Ibid.*, P. 601).

Now what are "special circumstances"? These are said to be the concrete situations in which men and things stand in relation to each other. This, not the ideal, demands how we should act in special cases. According to Dewey, the problem how we should act, must be the same as the one how we act. He says that there is no "ought to do" except "something to be done" in concrete situations. What we should do here and now, is said to be sought for in these actual conditions. He shows that Green's ideal is "the bare thought of an ideal," which cannot very well work in specific situations. Is this true with Green? His ideal seems

to be separated from the actual as a helpless one, but we must not lose sight of the religious ground of the ideal. Green's ideal is not a dead one, but a living and awakening principle in us. Self, which is conscious of it, cannot fail to work in action. What did Dewey think about this point? Says he: "his (Green's) unity is so thoroughly abstract that, instead of urging us to seek for the deed that would unify the situation, it rather says that no unity can be found in the situation because the situation is particular, and therefore set over against the unity" (Ibid., P. 602). At first sight, this is an adequate objection to Green's moral philosophy. But we must bear in mind that we need to consider his philosophy as a whole. I cannot understand why Dewey omitted to quote the following sentences of Green. Says Green: "Yet the conviction that there must be such a state of being, merely negative as is our theoretical apprehension of it, may have supreme influences over conduct, in moving us to that effort after the better, which, at least as a conscious effort, implies the conviction of there being a Best" (Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Fifth Edition, 1906, PP. 196—97). Green failed to satisfy the theoretical demands of philosophers, and he ended in asserting "the conviction of there being a Best". These are probably the reasons why Dewey showed the helplessness of Green's ideal. But we cannot say that it is incapable of "urging us to seek for the deed that would unify the situations", because the ideal is the content of self-consciousness, which is capable of not only distinguishing itself from impulses, but also unifying itself with one of its desires. Namely, self-consciousness is a consciousness as an unity. Such a consciousness was a will to action, which Green calls "spring". Says he: "The practical struggle after the Better, of which the ideal of there being a Best has been the spring, has taken such effect in the world of man's affairs as makes the way by which the Best is to be more nearly approached plain enough to him that will see" (Ibid., P. 197). Why did Dewey say that Green's ideal was incapable of urging us to seek for action suitable to it? Green never intended the complete separation of the actual from the ideal.

The former is essentially combined with the latter. It is true that Green's ideal was not regarded as realized in the actual; but it is only partially realized in society. But we must remember that he was interested in an ideal as a promoting power. This does not mean that it is incapable of working as a motive. The power comes from the operation of a divine principle in us. Without this there is perhaps no moral motive which makes us seek for everlasting satisfaction. With this we can seek for the direction, in which true good lies. This is the fundamental view of Green about "moral motive". Why was Dewey not willing to recognize this fact?

He cut off the metaphysical and religious aspect of Green's system from the rest of it. He considered only the moral and psychological aspect of it. Green's philosophy consists of metaphysical, moral, political, and religious elements. And yet it is of special importance that these must be considered from the religious aspect of the system, because his philosophy is based upon the consciousness of a religious ideal. Therefore, we must examine Green's philosophical system as a whole.

The second point which Dewey criticizes is that Green has no method of translating an ideal in specific situations. Says Dewey: "It is at most the consciousness *that* there is

something to do and that this something has unconditional claims upon us. We are as far as ever from any method of translating this something in general into the special thing which has to be done in a given case. And here, as before, this unconditional law not simply fails to carry with itself any way of getting concrete, But it stands in negative relation to any transfer into particular action" (The Philosophical Review, I, P. 603). What does "method of translating" mean? If it means that knowledge is to be used as a tool for actualizing an ideal, Green has not any. But Green tries to realize it in a society. An ideal, which is common good, has been realized in history, and though it has been done in a somewhat incomplete form, it has been actualized in laws, institutions, and customs. Green may not have "any method of translating" an ideal end, but we must bear in mind that he tried to actualize this end. In fact, Dewey recognized this point (Ibid., P. 605), but he said that Green's attitude was conservative, and therefore his theory did not show us any progress. Dewey's method of translating an ideal into a specific thing to be done means that of its being transferred into particular action. Is there not any such an attempt in Green? When we read "Book II, *Prolegomena to Ethics*" by Green, we can see how will, intellect, and desire co-operate. For Green the object is not that of mere desire, but is that of the desire with which man is identified. This certainly anticipates how we can act in a specific situation. The co-operation of will, intellect, and desire probably tells us the way in which we should act in concrete situations. This view is very similar to Dewey's next one; "A moral situation is one in which judgment and choice are required antecedently to overt action. The practical meaning of the situation—that is to say the action needed to satisfy it—is not self-evident. It has to be searched for. There are conflicting desires and alternative apparent goods. What is needed is to find the right course of action, the right good" (Reconstruction in Philosophy, Mentor Book, 1953, P. 133). Nevertheless, why does Dewey say that Green has no method of translating an ideal into a concrete end? Green has no knowledge as to how an ideal can be realized in actual conditions. This is probably an important difference between Green and Dewey. Says the latter: "It (theory) must wait upon the instruction that every new case, because of its individuality, its uniqueness, carries with it, but it must also bring to this special case such knowledge of the reality of all action, such knowledge of the end and process involved in all deeds, that it *translates* naturally into the concrete terms of this special case" (The Philosophical Review, I, P. 596). This is the standpoint of Dewey. Is there any such knowledge in the theory of Green's self-realization? There is a conviction in him, which seems to be almighty, but is not connected with the method of actualizing it. These are the points which Dewey criticizes. Says Dewey: "Granted that the thought of a better would arise from the opposition of a Good upon the whole to every special good, as depicted by Green, how are we to advance from this thought of a better to any notion of *What* that better is, either as to the prevailing tendency of life, the direction in which we are to look for improvement upon the whole, or in any special situation"? (The Phil. Rev., I, P. 603). In short, it seemed to Dewey that Green was only asserting an ideal. What he was short of, was the analysis of the situations in which man was placed. Namely, Green was devoid of the knowledge of the concrete relationship of men and things. If he had considered this relationship closely, his

ideal might not have stood aloof from the special thing to be done. According to Dewey, what we need is not a remote ideal, but knowledge as to how to realize it. And yet it must be discovered in actual situations. But Green's ideal was a fixed one, and stood aloof from the special thing to be done. Dewey tries to regard this special thing as an end, and goes on to say that there is no end outside of this something. However, there is a gap between the ideal and the actual in Green. Thus, a bridge is required between them. Is there any bridge in Green? This was a question raised by Dewey.

Now what is knowledge in regard to action? Says Dewey: "observation of the detailed makeup of the situation; analysis into its diverse factors; clarification of what is obscure; discounting the more insistent and vivid traits; tracing the consequences of the various modes of action that suggest themselves; regarding the decision reached as hypothetical and tentative until the anticipated or supposed consequences which led to its adoption have been squared with actual consequences. This inquiry is intelligence" (Reconstruction, P. 133). He shows that we can know what to do by such an analysis, and we cannot act rightly without knowing what is to be done. What is the case with Green? Indeed, he insisted on will, but, as said before, he considered the close relations of will to desire, of desire to intellect, and of will to intellect. Further, he considered will and reason together, and yet regard these under the two developmental aspects of one divine principle. We could not say that Green did not try to consider the ideal apart from the actual. Nevertheless, why does Dewey say that Green is short of the method of translating the former into specific action? Because Green has no method of analysing situations, and this is due to his unsympathetic attitude towards science. Dewey's method is a scientific one, which he tries to apply to ethics. While Green is interested in metaphysics, Dewey is interested in science. They both are interested in intelligence, but what they mean by it is different. For Green intelligence is "the action of a free or self-conditioned and eternal mind in man" (Prolegomena, P. 95), and it is "conscious of change," but "cannot be developed out of any succession of change" (Ibid., P. 95). This principle is, according to Green, one which we cannot explain scientifically, but must suppose in knowledge and morals. It is "the distinctive intelligence of man", different from animals. For Dewey "reason is experimental intelligence, conceived after the pattern of science, and used in the creation of social arts; it has something to do. It liberates man from the bondage of the past, due to ignorance and accident hardened into custom. It projects a better future and assists man in its realization. And its operation is always subject to test in its experience" (Reconstruction, P. 89).

## II

We have considered that there is a separation of the ideal from the actual in Green, and that there is also no method of translating the former into a concrete end to be realized in him. This consideration leads us to the examination of the relations of an end to means implied in Green's self-realization. As long as an end can be thought of, there must also be a means to realize it. Is an end outside of means or within it? This is an end, that is a means to realize it. Is this a right way of thinking? Green and Dewey both seem to be interested

in this problem. Dewey criticizes Green as follows: there are two selves in Green, one of which is "the already realized self", and the other of which is "the ideal self". As the former endeavours to attain the latter, there must be supposed a split between them. How can this gap be bridged? It seems that there is a permanent gap between them. Where is the error of this thinking? Says Dewey: "By making the present activity the expression of the full meaning of the case, that activity, indeed, an end in itself, not a mere means to something beyond itself; but, in being a totality, it is also the condition of all future integral action" (The Phil. Rev., II, P. 660). Dewey says that an end cannot be separated from a means, and they are one and the same thing. He might say that the distinction between the two is only an illusion, and the actual is one activity. However, if one thinks that there is a means to an end, this way of thinking is dualism, and is not a right insight into the fact. Why is this false? We can interpret what Dewey wants to say as follows: if on thing is a means to an end, man cannot find out "the full meaning of the case" in present activity. His interest is in a remote end. He cannot discover his meaning until the end has been attained. Even if the end has been realized, there must still be discovered a new end, and must be found a means to it. Thus, there will always be a parallel. He seems as if he could not make "the present activify the expression of the full meaning of the case".

Now how did Green think about the relation of means to an end? Says Green: "It is as well to confess at once that, when we are giving an account of an agent whose development is governed by an ideal of his own perfection, we cannot avoid speaking of one and the same condition of will alternately as means and an end. The goodness of the will or man as a means must be described as lying in direction to that same goodness as an end. For the end is that full self-conscious realisation of capabilities to which the means lies in the self-conscious exercise of the same capabilities—an exercise of them in imperfect realisation, but under the governing idea of the desirability of their fuller realisation" (Prolegomena., PP. 224—25). It is clear that Green tried to think about the close relations of means to an end. Cannot we see that Green's "full self-conscious realisation of capabilities" is very similar to Dewey's "making the present activity the expression of the full meaning of the case"? An end and means are not different, but are in the same direction in Green. They are not strictly to be divided. They are mutually linked in internal relations. Is there any possibility of thinking in this way in Green? At first sight, there is a difference between "the full self-conscious realisation" and "self-conscious exercise of the same capabilities". The former is a higher end, and the latter is a means to it. But the means lies in direction to the end. They are not external. They are only names for the degrees of the stages of the same self-realization. This is the view of Green. But as long as "man as a means must be described as lying in direction to that same goodness as an end", we cannot help recognizing that there is still a gap between the two. This view is not perhaps the same as Dewey's "making the present activity the expression of the full meaning of the case". This difference is the point which Dewey makes clear. Says Dewey: "For morality consists in not degrading any required act into a mere means towards an end lying outside itself, but in doing it for its own sake, or, again, in doing *as self*" (The Phil. Rev., II, P. 622). Dewey maintains this against Green, but, as we have considered, Green did

not regard the relation of means to an end as "a mere means towards an end lying outside itself". However, Dewey's contentions seem to me more important, because he tried to make clear the relation of means to an end as one and the same fact which cannot be divided into two parts. Dewey did not say as follows; this is an act, that is an end; or, there is an act as a means on the one hand, and there is an ideal as an end on the other hand. According to him, the fact is that they are one and the same reality in the process of self-realization. For instance, "Not health as an end fixed once and for all, but the needed improvement in health—a continual process—is the end and good. The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. It is the active process of transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a final good, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in living". (Reconstruction, P. 141). Dewey rejects a fixed and abstract end, because it is useless for action. The notions of an end must be changed in order that it may influence action. Dewey's way of thinking is very dynamic. This is similar to that of Green. When we compare the above sentences with the following ones of Green, we can find out some similarities between them. Says Green: "The end for which the sacrifice is demanded is one which in the sacrifice itself is in some measure attained—in some measure only, not fully, yet so that the sacrifice is related to the complete end, not as a means in itself valueless, but as a constituent to a whole which it helps to form. That realisation of the powers of the human spirit, which we deem the true end, is not to be thought of merely as something in a remote distance, towards which we may take steps now, but in which is no present participation. It is continuously going on, though in varying and progressive degrees of completeness." (Prolegomena, P. 462). We can find two similar ways of thinking in Green and Dewey. The first is that they think about the close relations of means to an end, which are not regarded as two external parts. The only difference is that while Green regards means as "related to complete end", or "as a constituent to a whole", Dewey regards the two as the same. The second point is that their ways of thinking are dynamic; while Dewey regards an end as an enduring process of perfecting, Green also regards it as a "continuously going on". They both view things under the aspect of development. Therefore, we may say that Dewey was in some degree interested in the self-realization of Green.

Nevertheless, why did Dewey criticize Green? Green did not make clear the close relations of means to an end. What Dewey wants to say is that there is one and the same activity, which cannot be divided into means and an end. Life is a process of continuous activity, in which all human functions operate together, and one side of life cannot be seen apart from the other. Life is one activity in itself, not a preparation for future life. Says Dewey: "if I were asked to name the most needed of all reform in the spirit of education; I should say: "Cease conceiving of education as mere preparation for later life, and make of it the full meaning of the present life". And to add that only in this does it become truly a preparation for after life is not the paradox it seems" (The Phil. Rev., II, P. 660). Pay attention to the present life here and now, you will find the full meaning of it. Don't dream of a remote ideal, or you cannot find the full meaning of it. This is perhaps the point on which Dewey insists. I must say that this view is a little similar to that of the thought of Zen, which is a Japanese

traditional Buddhism. Zen teaches us, "Be one with the actual", "don't think about anything else". If we regard education and religion as "mere preparation for later life", this way of thinking will be easily connected with that of the thought of the separation of means from an end.

Now let us consider a difference between Green and Dewey. Though they showed the undividedness of means from an end, their views about the end are different. What is the difference? For Green a true or ideal end itself is not changeable in time and space. It is always constant, but is gradually realizing itself through reason and will. He shows that the end is realizing itself by man's endeavour to attain it through his animal organs, and yet without being subject to them. This is why moral progress can not help being gradual. Man is changeable in will, intellect, and desire. So he must be unified by showing him a constant end. He can only grow up by the operation of the ideal upon him. If the ideal is not fixed for him, how and in what direction can he act? This is the question from which Green starts. We must remember that Green's ideal is God, which is an immanent God in us, and which is to be identified with ideal or possible self. This is his conviction. For Green God is neither external King, nor father as an outward power. He is a very near being to man. When Green says that an ideal or true end is not changeable, at least he has two problems to be solved. One of these is how rational faith is possible. The other is why hedonism cannot be the basis of ethics. We must remember these points in order to understand Green's ideal end.

What is the case with Dewey? For him ends change according as concrete situations change. If these demand a new action, this action is an end. The end has changed now. As man must adapt himself to different situations, his actions change. This makes man good. Where he creates new notions of good and discovers new methods of realizing it, there is a realization of good. But "He has identified himself with his past notions of himself, and, refusing to allow the fructifying pollen of experience to touch them, refusing to revise his conception of himself in the light of the widest situation in which he finds himself, he begins to disintegrate and becomes a standing menace to his community or group". (The Phil. Rev., II, P. 661). Why did Dewey think of the case in such a way? It was a vital question how man was able to adapt himself to environment. He receives stimulus from the environment and reacts upon it. Thus, he thinks how to act in a given case. We may say this as follows: Man tries to attack the actual, and he discovers problems to be solved. Intelligence operates in such a concrete situation. If principles and ends are used as tools for the change of environment, they are valuable. They must be tested in experience. If they are constant, unchangeable, how can they adapt themselves to environment? This is the question from which Dewey starts. There is a practical interest or attitude in Dewey. Namely, how to act in specific situations, what is an end here and now, and how can it be realized, these questions are vital concerns for him. They can only be solved by the analysis of actual conditions. The end to be discovered there are not the same, and they are different according as man's adaptations to environment change. Therefore, they are progressive with the operation of intelligence.

Is an ideal unnecessary for Dewey? He is concerned with the problem how the ideal can



work to move us to action. If it can be considered as remote, how can it work for action? The question is how we should interpret the ideal. For Dewey the ideal is a tool as a working principle, and it is not an eternal end. Says he: "The ideal is realized through its own use as a tool or method of inspection, experimentation, selection and combination of concrete natural operations" (Reconstruction, P. 105). The ideal is not an ultimate and complete end. It admits of being changed, or revised. It is not fixed, because it must be changed if environment demands a new action. It is only an idea to change actual situations. It may be an error, and whether it is true or not depends on 'its own use'. These characteristics of the ideal show a striking contrast with those of an ultimate end in the metaphysical sense. It is true that Green's Ideal is to be identified with God, and therefore it is eternal. On the contrary, Dewey's ideal is considered as a tool of analysis. For him it is neither all, nor almighty. It is one of many factors which intelligence discovers in concrete situations. But for Green the ideal seems as if it were either all or almighty. If this is given, the rest will be naturally solved. If man keeps an ideal, he can well act without sufficient analysis of situations. This may not be necessarily true with Green, but I think that there is such a tendency in him. The following sentences seem to show a difference between Green and Dewey: "When the belief that knowledge is active and operative takes hold of men, the ideal is no longer something aloof and separate; the ideal is rather that collection of imagined possibilities that stimulates men to new efforts and realizations. It still remains true that the troubles which men undergo are the forces that lead them to project pictures of a better state of things. But the pictures of the better is shaped so that it may become an instrumentality of action, which in the classic view the Idea belongs ready-made in a noumenal world. Hence, it is only an object of personal aspiration or consolation, while to the modern, an idea is a suggestion of something to be done or of a way of doing" (Reconstruction, PP. 103—104).

It is certain that there is a "personal aspiration" in Green's Philosophy. For him this aspiration, which "constitutes the consciousness of the ideal", is primarily important. His fundamental attitude lies in such an aspiration towards the ideal or "an ideal of holiness", and therefore it is a negative one for knowledge. This is best illustrated by the following sentences: "The more complete the realisation of its capacities, the clearer will be its apprehension at once of its own infinity in respect of its consciousness of there being an infinite spirit—a consciousness which only a self-communication of that spirit could convey—and of its finiteness as an outcome of natural conditions: a finiteness in consequence of which the infinite spirit is for ever something beyond it, still longed for, never reached. Towards an infinite spirit, to whom he is thus related, the attitude of man at his highest and completest could still be only that which we have described as self-abasement before an ideal of holiness; not the attitude of knowledge, for knowledge is of matters of facts or relations, and the infinite spirit is neither fact nor relation; not the attitude of full and conscious union, for that the limitation of human nature prevents; but the same attitude of awe and aspiration which belongs to all the upward stages of the moral life" (Prolegomena., PP. 361—62).

## III

Now let us consider the influences of Green upon Dewey. It seems that the latter's instrumentalism is a developmental form of the former's self-realization. Why can we say so? Dewey himself seems to be sympathetic with Green, though he criticized Green. Let us consider these sentences of Dewey. "Now this theory so far might be developed in either of two directions. The self-distinguishing process may mean the method by which the self specifies or defines its own activity, its own satisfaction; all particular desires and their respective ends would be, in this case, simply the systematic content into which the self differentiated itself in its progressive expression. The particular desires and ends would be the modes in which the self relieved itself of its abstractness, its undeveloped character, and assumed concrete existence. The ends would not be *merely* particular, because each would be one member in the self's activity, and as such member, universalized. The unity of the self would stand in no opposition to the particularity of the special desire; on the contrary, the unity of the self and the manifold of definite desires would be the synthetic and analytic aspects of one and the same reality, neither having any advantage metaphysical or ethical over the other. Such is *not* the interpretation Green gives. The self does not, according to him, define itself *in* the special desire; but the self distinguishes itself *from* the desire. The objectification is not of the self *in* the special end; but the self remains behind setting the special object over against itself as not adequate to itself" (The Phil. Rev., I, PP. 599—600).

I can raise two points. One of these is whether Green's self is not "the unity of the self and the manifold of definite desires"; whether the self is separated from the desires. The other is whether the self is merely distinguished *from* the desire; whether it is not defined "*in* the special desire". As to the first point, we can consider it as follows. Green's self is never separated from desire. These are two different aspects of the same self-realization. Green calls this "the many-sided development of a single spiritual principle" (The Works of T. H. Green, III, 1891, P. 100). This is perhaps the same expression as "the unity of the self and the manifold of definite desires" on which Dewey insists. The only difference is probably that Dewey does not recognize "a single spiritual principle". He tries to develop Green's self-realization into "the synthetic and analytic aspects of one and the same reality", and he says that this way of thinking is not found in Green. But is this true with Green? For instance, says Green: "Meanwhile the error which lies in the treatment of reason and will as separate faculties we may correct by bearing in mind that it is one and the same self of which reason and will are alike capacities; that in every moral action, good or bad, each capacity is exerted as much as the other; and that every step forward in the realisation of the divine principle in man, involves a determination of will no less than of reason, not merely a conception of a possible good for man, but the adoption by some man or men of that good as his or theirs" (Prolegomena., P. 205). Green tries to think of all capacities as the different or many-sided aspects of the same self. That is to say, they are not regarded as separate. His self-realization is progressively considered as the processes or stages of the development of such a self. Indeed, desire, will, and reason may not be examined as "the systematic content", but Green's will and reason are two different capacities of the same self. Therefore, we may say that the

realization of such a self will be "the systematic content".

As to the second point, namely, whether the self is merely distinguished *from* the desire, we can say as follows. Green's self is not only a self-distinguishing principle, but also a unifying one. This anticipates the synthetic and analytic aspects of the self. Says Green: "The object is one which for the time the man identifies with himself, so that in being determined by it he is consciously determined by himself" (*Prolegomena*, P. 165). Green's self-realization is the principle of identification. This is possible by the co-operation of will and desire. As said before, Green tries to show the close relations of will to desire, of desire to intellect, and of intellect to will. Therefore, we cannot say that the self does not define itself *in* the special desire. The self is, according to Green, never separated *from* the desire. If so, a motive would be regarded as an abstract one. Green's motive consists of desire, will, and intellect. This can be easily understood, if we think how will can be determined.

We can find out a very similar way of thinking between Green and Dewey. What is it? They see human action under the aspect of the process of development. Man and his actions are seen to be growing. Of course, their opinions about the process of development are different, because their standpoints are different. In spite of this difference, it seems to me that Dewey was very much influenced by the conception of process or progress. They didn't think of things and human actions as piecemeal, but saw them as a whole. Green considered this process in the direction of the union of will and reason. These are not harmonized in our actual life. They must be united in order that we may become good. This union cannot be achieved at once, but it must be done gradually. It is continuously going on. The development of will and reason means that they can be unified by their formation. Namely, they must be transformed into the direction of their unity. But this unity will not be completely attained. Yet true good will be in this direction. Therefore, the development cannot help being gradually done. This is why Green regarded self-realization as a process. What is the case with Dewey? He says that "One of the most immediate duties of philosophical reconstruction with respect to the development of viable instruments for inquiry into human or moral facts is to deal systematically with *human* processes" (*Reconstruction*, P. 28). What are "human processes"? It seems to me that his conception of process can be well understood from its two sides. One of these is an intelligence different from that of old philosophers. The other is a practical attitude to the actual situations in the individual case. Each individual's action is different with regard to each situation. There is not the same response to this. Therefore, when he thinks as to how to act, his way of action is different from the other's. He himself will be different according as the situations in which he lives, change. In short, Dewey's process seems to be derived from these assumptions. So there is a difference between Green and Dewey about the conception of process. What is a striking difference between them?

Green's intelligence is metaphysical. Says he: "For the self-realisation of the divine principle in man this change of will is just as necessary as the development of practical reason, and to an intelligence which could view the process as a whole would appear inseparable from it." (*Prolegomena*, PP. 203—204). It seems to me that there are two viewpoints in Green, which are certainly difficult to reconcile. One of these is the intelligence in the metaphysical

sense, in which things can be seen as a whole, as if they were governed by the Administration of the Universe. Another is an individual's endeavour to attain the ideal, or the unity of self which is represented by the harmony of will and reason. The former is a contemplative type of thinking. But how is it connected with "the self-realisation of the divine principle"? Is it independent of faith? It is not easy to apprehend this relation. At any rate, Green is certain to suppose one intelligence. Edward Caird said that Green tried to show man as *sub specie aeternitatis* (Prolegomena to Ethics, Fifth Edition, Preface, P. vii), but the intelligence may mean this word.

Now there is no such meaning about intelligence in Dewey. His intelligence is an experimental one, which is created and changed in experience. This is possible by reaction to environment. His fundamental problem seems to be how man can adapt himself to it. Dewey also replaces Green's self by interest. For Dewey this is important. If man has no interest, he cannot will to act in specific situations. Interest is a moving force for him. It may be in environment, or it may be in himself, or it may be in natural things. At any rate, human action comes from interest, which is discovered in experience. Dewey shows where his conception of process is different from Green's: "Antithesis between form and content, ideal and actual, is an undoubted fact of our experience; the question, however, is as to the meaning, the interpretation, of this fact. Is it an antithesis which arised *within* the process of moral experience, the experience bearing in its own womb both ideal and actual, both form and content, and also the rhythmic separation and redintegration of the two sides? Or, is the antithesis between the process of moral experience, *as such*, and an ideal outside of the experience and negative to it, so that experience can never embody it? It is because Green interprets the fact in the latter sense that he shuts himself up to an abstract ideal which unqualifiedly resists all specification, and which is therefore useless as an organ for our moral activity" (The Phil. Rev., I, PP. 607—608).

Roughly speaking, this difference may be accepted, but there may also be controversy as to whether an ideal is directly opposite to experience in Green, because Green thinks of sense and reason, or desire and reason in their co-operative relations. These are never separated. But these are seen from the ideal point of view, and therefore they may be incomplete not only in their actual operations, but also in what they produce. Thus, faith is required. Green's contentions imply the above implications, which are fragmentally repeated, or not necessarily consistently expressed. Green's philosophy contains two ways of thinking. One is a metaphysical and religious point of view. The other is a psychological point of view. These are mutually connected, and the former anticipates the latter. But it seems to me that Green does not succeed in combining these. Now Dewey pays attention to the psychological side. He does not try to consider the metaphysical or religious side. He cut off the former from the latter in Green's system. Why did he omit to consider the religious side of it? When we compare Green with Dewey, we see that they both are interested in the process of development, but at the same time there is this difference between them. Green shows that the process of self-realization is that of "the self-realisation of the divine principle in man". His theory rests on this principle. On the contrary, Dewey shows that the process of self-realization is that of

scientific intelligence.

In spite of this fundamental difference, Dewey was interested in the theory of the self-realisation of Green. Why was he so? One major reason is that Dewey sympathizes with the volitional side of the theory. The following shows this: "In the newer contentions regarding the moral end, the idea of "self-realization" insists upon its claims. The idea seems to me an important one, bringing out two necessary phases of the ethical ideal: namely, that it cannot lie in subordination of self to any law outside itself; and that, starting with the self, the end is to be sought in the active, or volitional, side rather than in the passive, or feeling, side" (*The Phil. Rev.*, II, PP. 652—53). Dewey's intelligence seems to be connected with will. Green's will is connected with reason, which is also divine. For Dewey will has been transformed into the form of intelligence. It is because of this connection that they are both interested in practice.

#### IV

We have examined how Dewey criticized the relations of the ideal to the actual, of a means to an end, and the process of self-realization in Green. These problems are those which go around one central point, namely, "self-realization". Therefore, let us consider what Green's self-realization is, and what the questions to be examined are. Firstly, let us see how Dewey criticized self-realization. Says he: "Such a theory as that of T. H. Green, for example, with its assumptions of "eternally complete consciousness" constituting the moral self to be realized by man, illustrates what I mean by a fixed and presupposed self. Any theory which makes the process of moral experience a process of gradually attaining this ideal self, illustrates the same conception. Any theory which does not make the self always "there and then", which does not make it a reality as specific and concrete as a growing tree or a moving planet must, in one form or another, set up a rigid self, and conceive of realization as filling up its empty frame work" (*The Phil. Rev.*, II, P. 653—54). Green's idealism, according to Dewey, is dualism. This is why Dewey was not able to accept some aspects of the theory of self-realization. What is the dualism? It is said that Green divides self into two parts, namely, the actual and the ideal. He does not try to think of it in specific situations. The self is not the specification of desire, but is remote from it. The self is "a fixed and presupposed self". There is always a gap between two selves. This division can only be an illusion. The moral fact cannot be explained by this way of thinking. This is the point from which Dewey starts. How does he attempt to overcome the above division? Says he: "To find the self in the highest and fullest activity possible at the time, and to perform the act in the consciousness of its complete identification with self (which means, I take it, with complete interest) is morality, and is realization" (*The Phil. Rev.*, II, P. 622). Dewey shows that self and act are the same activity, and they cannot be separated from each other. If we separate them into different parts, we cannot apprehend the facts rightly. Activity and consciousness are one and the same reality of the self. Of course, they can be seen as different aspects of the self, but this is not the division which is constant. This is the view of Dewey.

Now what is the case with Green? Indeed, he may not have shown the complete identifica-

tion of an act with self, but his self-realization is that of the consciousness of the identification of self with God. It is certain that he insists on an effort towards such an identification, or on an aspiration for God as an ideal self. Green did not say that it was possible "to find the self in the highest and fullest activity possible at the time". It is perhaps because of this that faith is required for complete self-realization. But self-realization is neither "preparation for later life", nor "filling up its empty frame work". It is a living process, and it is a "growing tree". The character of Green was said to be such a tree, and as long as his character reflected itself into his theory, we cannot say that self-realization was not a "growing tree". However, we cannot but recognize that his theory shows a gap between the actual and the ideal. Dewey says "To find the self in the highest and fullest activity possible at the time is ..... realization", but how is this possible? We can find two answers to this. One of these is a psychological one. Says Dewey: "It is, I think, a simple psychological fact that no act can be completely done save it absorbs attention. If, then, while doing the act, attention must also be directed upon some outside ideal of goodness, the act must suffer, being divided". (The Phil. Rev., II, P. 662). That is to say, the concentration of attention is required in order to find the self in the fullest activity. If we think about anything else "while doing the act", we are divided into two selves, or act and this something else. Here thinking does not become the same as the act, but is separated from it. Attention has not yet been one with thinking. If these two capacities cannot be united into one, the highest and fullest activity of the self would be impossible. Another answer is a knowledge as to the method of self-realization. Says Dewey: "To realize capacity means to act concretely, not abstractly; it is primarily a direction to us with reference to knowledge, not with reference to performance. I mean: do not act until you have seen the relation, the content, of your act" (The Phil. Rev., II, P. 659). What is the content of our act? And how can this be realised? These questions lead us to know how we should act in a concrete situation. Thus, intelligence plays an important part in this case. Dewey's intelligence seems to be that which makes clear the methods of actions. Says he: "Reason, always an honorific term in ethics, becomes actualized in the methods by which the needs and conditions, the obstacles and resources, of situations are scrutinized in detail, and intelligent plans of improvement are worked out" (Reconstruction., PP. 139—40).

We may say that the self-realization of Dewey is based on the two factors of attention and intelligence, or interest and reason. On what is the self-realization of Green based? It has two aspects which may be called a divine and a psychological one. And yet these are well connected under one self-realizing principle. Firstly, let us consider the following sentences: "By 'practical reason' we mean a consciousness of a possibility of perfection to be realized in and by the subject of the consciousness. By 'will' we mean the effort of a self-conscious subject to satisfy itself. In God, so far as we can ascribe reason and will to Him, we must suppose them to be absolutely united. In Him there can be no distinction between possibility and realisation, between the idea of perfection and the activity determined by it. But in men the self-realising principle, which is the manifestation of God in the world of becoming, in the form which it takes as will at best only *tends* to reconciliation with itself in the form

which it takes as reason" (Works of T. H. Green, Vol. II, 1890, P. 326). We may say that Green's self-realization is based on the two factors of reason and will. These are regarded not as separate, but as the two sides of "one consciously self-realising principle". Why can the self-realization be considered as an one principle? We can find two answers to this question. On the one hand, reason and will are the two different sides of the same self. On the other hand, they are those which are one in God; they are divine, not mere human capacities. Therefore, self-realization is the realization of these two capacities, but at the same time it is also the reconciliation or harmonization of the two. In God the two are completely united, but in men they are not. Thus, there is a gap in the process of self-realization, but at each stage of it men are full of life. This is the view of Green. We may raise the following questions: how is this possible?; man has natural impulses against the above self-realization; how can "the ideal human person" be realized? As said before, Green's self-realization has a psychological side, which is considered under the process of "one consciously self-realising principle". Says Green: "It (the self-realising principle) must overcome the "natural impulses", not in the sense of either extinguishing them or denying them an object, but in the sense of fusing them with those higher interests, which have human perfection in some of its forms for their object. Some approach to this fusion we may notice in all good men; not merely in whom all natural passions, love, anger, pride, ambition, are enlisted in the service of some great public cause, but in those with whom such passions are all governed by some such commonplace idea as that of educating a family" (The works., II, P. 327).

We can see that Green's self-realization has both a religious aspect and a psychological one. It is continuously going on towards the realization of the ideal. Is this process far from "the highest and fullest activity" in which the self can be found? Indeed, there seems to be a big division between the actual self and the ideal self, but this cannot perhaps be understood as the *external* relation of the former to the latter. Green's self-realization must be done as the *internal*. How can we interpret Dewey's following sentences? "It is not action *for* the self that is required (thus setting up a fixed self which is simply going to *get* something more, wealth, pleasure, morality, or whatever), but action *as* the self" (The Phil. Rev., II, PP. 661—662). Dewey regards Green's self as "*for* the self". As far as Green's self is that which seeks for the ideal, it can be interpreted as such. But Dewey's "*for* the self" seems to suggest that it is an external one. Green's end can be found in the actual self in itself. It is not foreign to the self. That is to say, it is immanent. On the other hand, we can well understand what Dewey intends to mean by "*as* the self". This is probably the same as "the consciousness of its complete identification with self". Dewey insists on the present activity of self. If we act "*for* the self", our attention will be divided into two objects. Such an activity is not "the fullest activity". Dewey rejects such a view. He tries to offer a new theory of self-realization. In what point is this different from that of Green? Firstly, he shows that self and realization are one and the same reality, or the activity of self is the same as the realization. We may say that the two are considered as one. Secondly, "the identity of self and realization" must be considered as "a concrete *specific* activity"; the self must take content from specific situations. At any rate, he rejects an abstract and fixed self.

He tries to consider the self as a dynamic and progressive one. It is not a fixed one, but that which can adapt itself to environment.

The above considerations may not show a striking difference between Green and Dewey. What is the originality of the latter? How is the self-realization of Dewey connected with instrumentalism? Dewey is first of all concerned with how man can adapt himself to his environment. This is the starting point of Dewey. On the contrary, Green is concerned with what the ideal is, and how it can be realized. This is his starting point. For Dewey principles are flexible, revised, and changing, but for Green they are not so, but are only partially realizing themselves in actual society. Dewey regards them as "hypotheses", but Green regards them as absolute. Bearing in mind that they have these differences, let us consider how Dewey's self-realization is connected with instrumentalism. We can give two samples which illustrate this. "In the first place, the interaction of organism and environment, resulting in some adaptation which secures utilization of the latter, is the primary fact, the basic category. Knowledge is relegated to a derived position, secondary in origin, even if its importance, when once it is established, is overshadowing. Knowledge is not something separate and self-sufficient, but is involved in the process by which life is sustained and evolved" (Reconstruction., P. 83). We can see that instrumentalism starts from "the interaction of organism and environment". Knowledge as a tool and principles as hypotheses come from the demands caused by this interaction. Secondly, let us consider the following sentence: "They (plans and principles) are hypotheses to be worked out in practice, and to be rejected, corrected and expanded as they fail or succeed in giving our present experience the guidance it requires. We may call them programmes of action, but since they are to be used in making our future acts less blind, more directed, they are flexible. Intelligence is not something possessed once for all. It is in constant process of forming, and its retention requires constant alertness in observing consequences, an open-minded will to learn and courage in re-adjustment." (Reconstruction., PP. 89—90).

What is the merit of Dewey? It is the methods which he made clear in realizing the ideal or ends, which were obscure in Green. Dewey's interest is always in actual and concrete situations, with which thinking and action begin. There is a will to realize the ideal in Green, but he is short of methods to do so.

In conclusion, I will summarize some differences and similarities between Green and Dewey. Firstly, they attempted to create a new philosophy by criticizing old types of philosophy. Green created a new anglicized idealism by studying Kant and Hegel. This is substituted for English empiricism. Dewey created an instrumentalism adapted to the American way of thinking by studying Green. Secondly, while Green did not necessarily sympathize with science, Dewey was very interested in it. The former tried to seek for the basis of ethics in metaphysics. For him Darwin and Spencer were clearly rivals, against whom he established ethics based on a metaphysical ground. I think that his real basis lies in a religion against traditional and formal religion. On the contrary, Dewey created an instrumentalism based on scientific method. He tried to apply this method to ethics. Thus, he liberated ethics from the traditional and metaphysical one. Thirdly, we must remember that they have different



backgrounds for their philosophies. In England theology and church were faced with a crisis by the development of science in the 19th century. The appearance of "The origin of Species" by C. Darwin was dangerous to faith. And yet many educated people wanted to seek for a faith different from the traditional one without destroying the essence of religion. Green answered this problem by developing the philosophy of idealism, instead of adopting scientific method. On the other hand, the United States of America is a comparatively new and vast country. This country is different in geographical and historical respect from England. Moreover, a pioneer spirit has been required to develop this country. How people can adapt themselves to environment, and how they can change it, must have been important problems for them. It is no wonder that Dewey showed a tunnel as an example to explain instrumentalism. (The Phil. Rev., I, PP. 594—95). All knowledges must be brought together, and used as tools for the end of building the tunnel in this case. A theory must be tested by using it. This way of thinking seems to be connected with the development of the United States of America. Fourthly, we may point out that while Dewey was interested in science, Green was interested in religion. However noble "a divine principle" or "ideal self" may be, these are only sentimental objects for Dewey. On the contrary, they are of vital importance for Green. His philosophy cannot be understood without considering the relation of philosophy to religion. Green's ideal is not an imaginary one, but a living principle which works in us and reacts upon us. Fifthly, Green and Dewey are both interested in the psychological aspect of man. Indeed, Green was concerned with metaphysics, but he did not lose sight of human nature. Green tried to combine will and reason. For instance, he uses such words as "desiring or wanting self-consciousness", or "self-conscious desire" (Works of H. T. Green, II, P. 134). Dewey seems to have developed his psychological view more. Lastly, they were both interested in practice, and therefore they did not play with mere abstract theories. Their philosophies were the theoretical expressions of their practical interests. For instance, Green founded the new Oxford High School for Boys before his death. This was the main object of his work as a councillor of the City of Oxford. His work came from his democracy, which was based on liberalism. What is the case with Dewey? We may say that he developed instrumentalism by criticizing Green, because he was very interested in practice. If he had not been concerned with practice, he might not have written "Reconstruction in Philosophy".